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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JERRI K. SCHWARTZ,
PlaintiffAppellee,

Case No. 940396 CA
Oral Argument
Priority 4

vs.
RANDALL I. SCHWARTZ,
DefendantAppellant.

JURISDICTION & NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Appeals pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1994), which grants
jurisdiction for appeals from district courts involving domestic
relations cases.
ISSUES PRESENTED
A.

B.

Factual Issues
1.

Was there sufficient evidence to support
court's finding as to Father's income?

the

2.

Was there sufficient evidence to support a finding
that Father had borrowed money from the children's
trust accounts to invest in marital business?

Discretionary Issues
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in
awarding custody of the children to the mother,
where the mother was more flexible with the
children and had a better relationship with the
oldest daughter than the father, and wanted to keep
all of the children together?

2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in
awarding one-half of the marital home to the wife,

where the home had been jointly deeded to husband
and wife as a gift from the husband's parents?
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in
dividing the marital business without joining the
husband's parents as parties?

4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in
requiring the husband to pay half of the total fees
for the custody evaluator?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A.

Factual Issues

Findings
standard.
1991).

of

fact are reviewed

under

a clearly

Walton v. Walton, 814 P. 2d 619, 621

erroneous

(Utah Ct. App.

A party seeking to overturn the trial court's findings of

fact must marshal the evidence in support of the Findings and
demonstrate
lacking

that

"despite

such

evidence, the

in support as to be against the

findings

clear weight

evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous."

Id.

are
of

so
the

In short, the

appellant must take the position of devil's advocate, presenting
all evidence supporting the trial court's findings, then exposing
a flaw sufficient to demonstrate the trial court's finding was
clearly erroneous.

West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co, 818 P. 2d

1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

When an appellant has failed to

marshal the evidence, the reviewing court assumes that the trial
court's findings of fact are supported by the record.

Walton. 814

P.2d at 621. The Utah Court of Appeals has "shown no reluctance to
affirm

when

evidence."

the

appellant

fails

adequately

to

marshal

the

Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & S, 247

Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
2

B.

Discretionary Issues

Custody decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.

Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P. 2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985).

Woodward, the Utah Supreme Court held that in reviewing

In

child

custody determinations, "we accord substantial deference to the
trial

court's

fashioning

findings

and

give

it

the appropriate relief.

considerable

latitude

in

We will not disturb that

court's actions unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the
contrary or there has been an abuse of discretion."
omitted).

Id. (citations

See also Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah Ct.

App. 1993); Sukin v. Sukin.

842 P.2d 922, 923

(Utah Ct. App.

1992) .
Division and awards of marital property are also reviewed
under the abuse of discretion standard.

As established by the Utah

Supreme Court in Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277, "[i]n
making such orders, the trial court is permitted broad latitude,
and its judgment is not lightly disturbed."

The Utah Court of

Appeals further held: "the trial court has considerable latitude in
adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are
entitled to a presumption of validity."
P.2d

1144, 1146

Naranio v. Naranio, 751

(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted).

The

division of assets will only be disturbed, continued the Naranio
Court "if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law
resulting in substantial prejudicial error. . . . "

3

Id.

As for the remaining issues, whether or not to join a party
under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is also
discretionary
discretion.
1990).

and will not be overturned absent an abuse of
Landes v. Capital City Bank. 795 P. 2d 1127 (Utah

And an award of attorney fees or costs (in this case half

of the custody evaluators' total fees) is likewise discretionary.
Crockett v. Crockett. 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
A court of equity only abuses discretion if there exists "no
reasonable basis for the decision." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch..
860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).

Only if the trial judge's ruling is

"so unreasonable that it can be classified

as arbitrary and

capricious or a clear abuse of discretion" will it be reversed.
Judge Norman H. Jackson, "Utah Standards of Appellate Review," Vol.
7. No. 8. Utah Bar J. 9, 19-20 (citing Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d
270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); and Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 476
(Utah Ct. App. 1993)).
PERTINENT STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(7)(a) (1990) (emphasis added):
Income may not be imputed to a parent unless
that parent stipulates to the amount imputed

or a hearing is held and a finding made that
the parent
is
voluntarily
unemployed
or
underemployed.
Rule 19(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1987) (emphasis added):
Persons to be joined if feasible. A person
who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
4

shall be joined as a party in the action if
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, or (2)
he claims an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave
any of the persons already parties subject to
a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple,
or
otherwise
inconsistent
obligations by reason of the claimed interest.
Rule 19(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1987):
Determination by court whenever joinder not
feasible.
If a person as described in
Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a
party, the court shall determine whether in
equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should
be dismisses, the absent person thus regarded
as
indispensable.
The
factors
to
be
considered by the court include: first, to
what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or
those already parties; second, the extent to
which, by protective provisions
in the
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other
measure, the prejudice can be lessened or
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in
the person's absence will be adequate; fourth,
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below

This is a divorce action involving issues of custody and
property division.
Randall

I.

bifurcated

The parties to this action, Jerri K. and

Schwartz,
proceeding

were
on

divorced

September

in

the

14, 1993.

first
(R.

part
172.)

of

a
On

December 20, 1993, trial on the issue of custody and visitation of

5

the couple's four children was held before Judge Anthony Schofield
of the Fourth District Court for Utah County.

(R. 212-19.)

The

disposition of the marital home, business and personal property, as
well as issues of support, took place in a subsequent proceeding on
March 1, 1994. The court issued its ruling dated March 30, 1994.
(R. 316.)
B.

Disposition at Trial Court

At trial, the plaintiff, Jerri K. Schwartz (Appellee in this
action) received primary physical custody of the children in a
joint custody arrangement.

She also received the marital home.

Appellant Randall I. Schwartz received the marital business and
joint custody of the children.
C.

Relevant Facts

During their marriage, the couple had four children and
acquired a home, a business, and various debts.

The home was a

gift to them from Mr. Schwartz's parents, who deeded it jointly to
both parties over a period of three years.

(R. 308-11.)

The

marital business, a feed store, began operations in 1987.

(R.

308.) In order to finance the business, the couple took loans from
Mr. Schwartz's parents totalling $66,3 3 3.00.

In adjusting the

disposition of the business to the parties, the court took into
account the amounts owed by the parties,to Mr. Schwartz's parents.
(R. 306-08.)

At one point, the couple borrowed $7,000 from trust

accounts that had been set up for the children by Mrs. Schwartz's
family; this money was used to pay bills for the business.

6

The

court included these trust account loans as liabilities in its
valuation of the business.

(R. 306.)

Before ruling on the custody issues, the court appointed a
custody evaluator and ordered that both parties share equally the
expenses incurred thereby.

(R. 180-81.) The trial court resolved

the issue of custody by giving joint custody to both parents, Mrs.
Schwartz having primary physical custody of the children.
322.)

(R.

The trial court found that both parties were good parents,

but given the mother's somewhat more flexible nature and better
relationship with the older daughter, the court ruled that Mrs.
Schwartz would be best suited as the primary custodial parent. (R.
299.)
The disposition of property was somewhat more complicated.
The marital home, which had been a gift to both parties deeded to
them over a period of three years, was given to Mrs. Schwartz; she
was required to pay Mr. Schwartz a sum representing a half interest
in the equity of the home.

The marital business was given to Mr.

Schwartz; he was required to pay Mrs. Schwartz a sum representing
a half interest in the equity of the business.
out the various

liabilities

the parties owed

The court evened
each other by

adjusting the amount of home equity owed by Mrs. Schwartz to Mr.
Schwartz.

(R. 320-21.)

In addition, Mr. Schwartz was required to

pay back the $7,000 taken from the children's trust funds and used
in the business.

(R. 298.)

7

As to the issue of child support, the court found that Mr.
Schwartz was drawing an income of $1000 monthly from the feed
business.

However, the court imputed income to him of $1,750

monthly for several reasons: the sum represented his actual income
from the store; he was able bodied; and he had made even more money
than that prior to voluntarily terminating his former job to
operate the feed store full-time.

(R. 304.) Because the issues in

this case are primarily fact-dependent, a more detailed discussion
of the case will be provided in the body of the argument.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the factual findings and discretionary decisions made by trial court below.

First, all factual

findings must be upheld because all are adequately supported by the
record; furthermore, since Mr. Schwartz has failed to marshal the
evidence this Court must assume they are sufficiently supported
and, consequently, not clearly erroneous.

As to factual Issue I,

the trial court's determination of Father's income was sufficiently
supported by the record.

Imputing income to Father was proper

since the court made an explicit finding that he was voluntarily
underemployed.

As to Issue II, there was sufficient evidence to

support the trial court's determination that Father borrowed money
from the children's trust accounts to invest in the marital
business.
Second, the remaining discretionary decisions of the court
must also be affirmed because each was supported by reasonable

8

bases and were neither arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of
discretion.

In deciding Issue III, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in awarding physical custody of the children to
Mother based on the Father's rigidity, inflexibility and strained
relationship with his oldest daughter, because Mother had a better
relationship with this daughter and the court wanted to keep all of
the children together.

The court did not abuse discretion in

deciding Issue IV when it awarded half of the marital home to the
Mother after finding that it was marital property; Utah law
presumes that marital property will be divided equally.

Neither

did the court abuse its discretion in finding it marital property,
despite the declarations of Husband's parents that the home was for
Husband's inheritance only. Husband's parents deeded the property
to both parties as tenants in common and Utah law presumes the
grantor's intent from the unambiguous reading of the deed.

The

intent to deed to both is further manifest in the favorable gift
tax consequences the parents received with a joint gift. Finally,
As to Issue V, the court did not abuse its discretion in requiring
each of the parties to pay half of the total fees of the courtappointed

custodial

evaluator,

including

testimony regarding the evaluation.

fees

from

No finding of

in-court
x

need' or

finding of *ability to pay' was needed since these were not costs
of either party but were court costs.

9

ARGUMENT
I.

There Was Sufficient Evidence To Support The Trial Court's
Finding Of Father's Income; Because Father Has Failed To
Marshal The Evidence, The Finding Must Be Taken As True.
Mr. Schwartz' phrasing of the issue ("Did the trial court

improperly

impute

income

to defendant?"),

is

an

attempt

characterize a factual issue as a question of law.

to

The trial

court's findings as to Mr. Schwartz' income were findings of fact.
The trial court's conclusions regarding how much support he must
pay to the children were inextricably connected to its findings of
fact and were a direct result of that factual finding. This Court
recently dealt with a similar situation in Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida
Cold Storage, 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

In that case

Oneida attempted to characterize two issues as being questions of
law but this Court found that the trial court's disposition of the
case "resulted from the trial court's findings of fact and not from
its application, interpretation or choice of law.

Thus despite

Oneida's characterization, all the issues presented on appeal
dispute the trial court's findings of fact."

Id. at 1052.

The question to be asked is whether there was sufficient
evidence to support the trial courts's findings regarding the
husband's income? The following findings of fact support the trial
court's determination:
68. Father is still residing with his
parents [he does not have to pay rent] . . . .
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69.
Prior to November, 1992, Father
worked for the LDS Church as a custodian.
Before his voluntary termination of employment
with the Church, he was making $10.61 an hour,
or approximately $1,800.00 per month.
70.
Following termination with the
Church, Father went to work at the feed store.
He draws $1,000.00 per month
from the
business, although the accountant reviewing
the books of the business testified that in
1993, Father also took a $9,000 draw from the
business
which
was
not
explained
or
contradicted.
71.
Father has not sought other
employment.
He is trying to protect his
parent's investment.
72.

Father is in good health.

76.
Father has an income of $1,000.00
per month, but he also took the additional
$9,000.00 draw in 1993, a total of $21,000.00.
He thus had an income in 1993 of $1,750.00 per
month. It is appropriate that this income be
imputed to him in that amount as he has
control over the store; its debts, other than
to parents have been reduced; he is able
bodied; and while working for the church, he
made even more.
He now works in the store
primarily to rescue his parents' investment.
The children suffer from less than they
deserve if he is able to base his support on
the monthly draws which he takes from the
store, rather than on all of the income he
took from the store last year, an amount more
nearly like what he earned before working in
the store. For purposes of calculating child
support,
Father's
income
is imputed
at
$1,750.00 per month.
(R. 304-05.)

These findings clearly support the trial courts

conclusions as to father's

income.

As husband has failed to

marshal the evidence in favor of these findings nor shown that they
were nonetheless

x

clearly erroneous' this court must take them to

11

be true.

West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 618 P.2d 1311,

1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
The findings further meet both the statutory and the common
law requirements for imputing income.

Under Utah Code Annotated

§78-45-7.5(7)(a):
Income may not be imputed to a parent unless
that parent stipulates to the amount imputed

or a hearing is held and a finding made that
the parent
is
voluntarily
unemployed
or
underemployed.
In this matter a hearing was held and the court made the finding
that father "voluntarily terminated" his more lucrative employment
as custodian of the IA3S Church. (R. 305, Finding 69, 76.)

The

Court further found that he had been making more money at his
previous job and was voluntarily and purposefully underemployed as
he tried to protect his parents investments; he was capable of
making more money; and he has less debt load and no rent to pay.
Id.

Surely these facts meet the common law requirement of Hall v.

Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)/ that at the time of trial
husband was voluntarily underemployed. The trial court did not say
that

husband

was

underemployed

x

to

avoid

paying

more

child

support', nor does the law require the underemployment to be with
Wrongful intent' or for Malicious reasons.' To impute income the
law requires voluntary underemployment and this was explicitly
found by the court.

This Court should thus uphold the trial

court's findings as to husband's income because they were not
clearly erroneous.
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II.

There Was Sufficient Evidence To Support A Finding That Father
Borrowed Money From The Children's Trust Accounts To Invest In
Marital Business; Because Father Has Failed To Marshal The
Evidence, The Finding Must Be Taken As True.
The trial court made the following finding of fact concerning

the money traced to the children/s trust accounts that was used to
pay bills for the business.

The trial court found:

63. The parties
borrowed $7,000.00 from
the children's trust accounts which the
children received from Mother's family. These
monies were used to pay the bills for the
business. Mother testified that they intended
to repay these loans with interest. Father
testified that he was not aware the money was
borrowed.
64.
The amount of the loans from the
children's trust accounts should be included
in the liabilities of the business.
(R. 306) (emphasis added) .

This is the finding that husband

disputes, but yet again he has failed to marshal the evidence in
its favor and then show that despite such evidence the finding was
clearly erroneous. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d
1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

The purpose of this marshaling

requirement is to promote "efficiency and fairness": efficiency
because the trial judge is in the best position to weigh the
evidence and credibility of the witnesses; fairness because the
appellant has the burden of proving the facts wrong, and neither
the appellee nor the appellate court should be forced to shoulder
that burden.

Oneida, 872 P.2d at 1053-54.

As Mr. Schwartz has

not marshaled the evidence this Court must find that there was

13

sufficient evidence to support the findings and accept them as
true.
As the findings indicate, Mrs. Schwartz testified at trial
concerning this money taken from the trust fund and used in the
marital business.
records and

Although Mr. Schwartz would like to have seen

cancelled

checks, and would

stress his

lack of

knowledge of the loan (Appellant's Brief at 18) neither of these
items would necessarily preclude the trial court's finding.

The

trial judge, evidently weighing the credibility of the witnesses,
chose to believe Mrs. Schwartz's account. Indeed, it is quite odd
that the husband did not ask any questions regarding the origin of
$7,000.00 which suddenly came into his wife's possession. But even
if he honestly did not know about the money's origin, the court
found it was traceable to the children's trust funds and that
husband shared equally in its expenditure.

It was not clearly

erroneous (nor an abuse of discretion should that standard be used)
to find that he should equally share in its repayment.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Awarding
Custody Of The Children To The Mother, Where The Mother Was
More Flexible With The Children And Had A Better Relationship
With The Oldest Daughter Than The Father, And The Court Wanted
To Keep All Children Together.
Husband's brief contains erroneous assertions that the "trial
court found both parents were good parents, and left the Children
with the Plaintiff because she was in the home and had been since
the separation." (Appellant's Brief at 6, citing R. 361, Findings
48 & 49.)

The true context of findings 48 and 49 reveals that the
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trial court was not concerned with custody at this point, but with
the division of property, namely the home:
48. Mother desires to live in the home.
She has custody of the children and they have
lived in the home since 1984. It is in the
best interests of the children and the Mother
that they be permitted to reside in the home
during the growing years.
49.
(R. 308.)

Mother is awarded the home.

The actual reasons given for custody can be found at

Findings 2 through 25.

Joint custody was awarded because both

father and mother are good parents with their children,s best
interests at heart.

However actual physical custody was given to

mother because, although father was found a good parent, all things
were not equal.

Among the factors tipping the balance in mother's

favor, the court found that she "has provided the greater portion
of parental care as between the parents. . . . "
22.)

(R. 313, Finding

In addition the court found that "[t]he Father is more rigid

and somewhat less flexible than Mother."

(Id., Finding 20.)

But

the key deciding factor in awarding physical custody to Mrs.
Schwartz was the fact that the children should remain together, and
that the oldest daughter has a "strained relationship with Father
. . . [h]e has not understood her as well and does not relate as
well with her as does Mother." (R. 314, Findings 11-16.) Since the
court found it was better to keep the oldest daughter with mother,
and that all the children should remain together, this dictated the
court's conclusion that mother should retain physical custody and
not the fact that she has lived in the home.
15

Thus, contrary to the assertions of Mr. Schwartz, the trial
court did not find that both parties were "equal" and give custody
to Mrs. Schwartz only because she was a woman/mother, nor were
there any implications of this in the court's findings or in the
trial transcript. Mr. Schwartz further incorrectly states that Dr.
Stewart, the custody evaluator, concluded that Mrs. Schwartz should
have the children "because Defendant had not proven her unfit."
(Appellant's Brief at 8 citing the Record at 189.)
clearly

contradicts this charge.

The record

At the trial Mr. Schwartz'

counsel asked Dr Stewart: "So then it is your testimony that given
all things equal, a mother

should

always have custody."

Stewart responded: "I said no such thing."
51.)

Dr.

(Transcript 1/20/94 at

Dr. Stewart further testified that Mrs. Schwartz had "better

parenting skills and a better relationship, especially with Keri,
and better long range potential for caring." (Id. at 48.)

She

also testified that the father's rigidity could be harmful to the
children, fid, at 35, 20); that he is high on the "lie scale" or
has the tendency to minimize his faults and deny his psychological
problems fid, at 29) ; and that he has a very strained relationship
with his oldest daughter, who would prefer to live with her mother
fid. 12-13.)
Husband further insinuates that the court improperly adopted
the custody evaluator's report and did not make its own decision.
This statement is wholly unsupported by the record.

The court's

findings are quite extensive and clearly indicate the decisional
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process used to reach the custodial determination.

(R. 311-315

Findings 1-25.)
Husband also cites Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah
1980), and Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),
regarding the interference with custodial visitation and antagonism
towards the other parent in the presence of the children.

Surely

these cases do indicate important reasons for or against awarding
custody to one parent or the other.

However, the trial court

found in Finding 24. e. , "Each parent so far has been and is
capable of encouraging positive relationships between the children
and the other parent. The Court is impressed with the maturity of
the

parents

and

the

willingness

they

demonstrated

to

work

cooperatively together in the best interests of the children." (R.
311.)

Also Findings 5 through 7 indicate that while the children

were in the temporary custody of their mother they visited every
other weekend and had two mid-week visits with their father, and
that due to this the bond between the children and each of the
parents was strong.

(R. 315.)

Furthermore, at trial Dr. Stewart

testified that of the two parties Mrs. Schwartz is more receptive
to visitation than is the father.

(Trial Transcript 1/20/94 at

25.J1
1

Again at page 8 of Appellant's Brief, counsel for husband has
misrepresented trial testimony.
Mrs. Schwartz testified under
cross examination that she never cut her husband's picture out of
family pictures, that she allowed the children to have pictures of
him in their room, that she merely removed their wedding picture
and replaced it with her parent's wedding picture. (Tr. 1/20/94 at
124-25). At the most the citations quoted by husband divulge that
17

Mr. Schwartz has not proven these findings clearly erroneous.
He has not even attempted to marshal evidence in their favor.
Rather he has selected portions of the transcript which support his
desired outcome.

Like the claimant in Oneida, Mr. Schwartz "has

merely presented carefully selected facts and excerpts of trial
testimony in support of its position.

Such . . . is nothing more

than an attempt to reargue the case before this court—a tactic we
reject."

872 P.2d 1051 at 1053 (citations omitted).

The trial court found that despite the qualifications and
moral integrity of both parents, that all things were not equal:
because the oldest daughter has a strained relationship with her
father, and because this child should remain with the other
children, the mother should have physical custody of all the
children.

This is a perfectly valid basis upon which the trial

court exercised its discretion. This Court should uphold the trial
court's custody determination.
IV.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Awarding Onehalf Of The Marital Home To The Wife, Where The Home Had Been
Jointly Deeded To Husband And Wife As A Gift From The
Husband's Parents.

Mrs. Schwartz has called her husband a "jerk," "petty," and when he
was trying to force an issue that wasn't true she said, "That's not
true. That's a lie." (Tr. 1/10/04 139). The so-called "assault on
Defendant" that husbands brief refers to could not meet any
definition of that term.
Wife removed a saddle from husbands'
horse. This is a far cry from assaulting him. (Tr. 1/20/94 157).
These selected passages from the trial transcript represent
husband's effort to reargue this case on appeal and should not be
tolerated by this court. Oneida, 872 P.2d 1051 at 1053.
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Husband appeals the trial court's finding that the family home
was a "marital asset" and thus claims that the trial court abused
its discretion in awarding wife the home, and husband one-half of
the equity in the home.
reasons.

Husband's claims should be denied for two

First, the property was intended as a joint gift to

husband and wife.

This was a factual finding of the court that

must be accepted as true since husband has failed to marshal the
evidence.

Second, even if the property were an inheritance for (or

a gift to) husband alone, the trial court would still maintain
discretion as to its division.
A. It Remains An Undisturbed Fact That Husband's Parents
Intended Joint Gift Of Property.
The trial court found that the property in question was not a
gift or inheritance for husband, but rather a joint gift to husband
and wife.

(R. at

309, Finding

39.)

While the trial

court

addressed husband's parents' contentions that the gift was for his
inheritance only, the court did not find such testimony credible.
(R. at 308-09, Findings 34, 39.)

Even if uncontroverted the court

could choose not to believe the parents' statement of intent.
Homer v. Smith. 866 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Moreover,

their statements of intent were controverted by their own later
statements and their express actions.

Husband's parents testified

at trial that the property was given to both parties as tenants in
common "to keep the peace" and because they thought the parties
would

be

"together

forever."

(R.
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309; Finding,

39.)

This

statement clearly shows intent for a joint gift.

Their actions in

deeding the property to both husband and wife as
"tenants in common" is further evidence of their intent.
Findings 38, 39.)
the

sole

(R. 309,

And while, as husband has noted, title is not

determining

factor

in

a

property's

characterization

(Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982)), under Utah law the
parents7 intent was manifest in the deed.

" A If the contract is in

writing and the language is not ambiguous, the intention of the
parties must be determined from the words of the agreement.'"
Crowther v. Mowler. 876 P.2d

876, 879-80

(Utah Ct. App. 1994)

(quoting Winegar v. Froerer. 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991).

That

the home was intended to be held as "tenants in common" is further
strengthened by the fact that unless the gift was indeed to both
parties, the parents would not have received the favorable gift tax
consequences that they enjoyed.

(R. at 309, Finding 39.)

Intent is a question of fact. Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d
356, 358 (Utah 1990) (noting that contractual intent is a question
of fact).

The trial court held that the intent of the parents was

to deliver the property to both husband and wife.
39, 40.)

(R. 3 09, Finding

As demonstrated by the previous paragraph, the record

supports this factual determination. Additionally, because husband
has not marshaled the evidence in favor of the finding and then
shown that it was "clearly erroneous" this Court must accept it as
true that the parties intended the property to be a joint gift and
not an inheritance.

It naturally follows that the property is a
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marital asset. Based on these findings, the trial court could not
have abused its discretion in equally dividing the property between
the parties: "once a court makes a finding that a specific item is
marital property, the law presumes that it will be shared equally
between the two parties. . . . "

Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022

(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
B. Even If The Property Were An Inheritance Or Gift To
Husband Only The Trial Court Would Still Retain
Discretion To Divide It As Equity Demanded In The
Circumstances.
Even if the property were considered an inheritance or gift of
husband only, husband has not shown that the equal division of such
was, under the circumstances, an abuse of discretion.

Husband

cites Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), as holding
that an inheritance or gift to one spouse made during the marriage
is not marital property and should be awarded to that spouse only.
Such is an oversimplification of the holding in that case.

In

Mortensen, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed all of the other Utah
cases on point, some which have upheld divisions of inherited
property to the non-inheriting spouse (citing Weaver v. Weaver, 442
P.2d 928 (Utah 1968); Bushell v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982);
and Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1973)) and others in
which the Court has affirmed awards of inherited property only to
the inheriting spouse (citing Preston v. Preston. 646 P.2d 705, 706
(Utah 1982); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987); Newmever v.
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987); and Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d
468 (Utah 1984)).

IcU 305-06.
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The Mortensen court expressly distinguished those cases in
which the non-inheriting spouse was given all or a portion of the
inheritance on the basis of several particular circumstances, one
of which was when the wife (or non-donee spouse) would not be
receiving alimony or attorney fees.

Id. at 306.

In this matter,

Mrs. Schwartz received possession and half of the equity interest
in the house, but since she was awarded neither alimony or attorney
fees she could fit into this Mortensen exception.
The Court continued stating that the general "rule that
property acquired by gift or inheritance by one spouse should be
awarded to that spouse of divorce . . . does not

the acquiring

spouse places

manner as to evidence

title

an intent

in their

joint

to make it marital

at 307 (italics added) (citations omitted).

apply

when . . .

names in such a
property."

Id.

It is an uncontro-

verted fact that title to the Schwartz property was held in their
joint names.

(R. at 309, Findings 38, 39.)

In summary then, the

fact that Mrs. Schwartz was not receiving alimony or attorney fees,
and the fact that the title was issued in joint tenancy, are two
reasons the Utah Supreme Court has held will allow a court to award
inherited or gift property to the non-donee or non-inheriting
spouse.
Furthermore, after balancing and summarizing the case law
supporting both positions the Mortensen Court concluded,
Significantly, no case has been found where
this Court has reversed a trial court's
disposition of gifts or inherited property
received by one party during the marriage. In
22

almost every case, we have emphasized the wide
discretion trial courts have in property
division and have refrained from laying down
any general rules for the disposition of gifts
and inherited property.
Id. at 307.
inheritance

Thus, even if the property could be considered an
intended

only

for husband,

the

trial

court

still

maintained discretion over its division.
Finally, to distinguish all of the cases which support the
award of property only to the inheriting or donee spouse, in every
one of those cases there was no doubt that the property
intended to be a gift or inheritance.
issued in only the name of the donee.

was

In Mortensen, stock was
Id. at 305.

In Burke, the

opposing party admitted that the property was an inheritance.

73 3

P.2d at 134. And in Argyle the husband's mother expressly made the
gift to the husband and his brother.

668 P. 2d at 469. Because the

question of intent is a factual matter, and since the court found
that the property was intended as joint property, this Court must
uphold the trial court's discretion because it is supported by a
reasonable basis.

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938

(Utah 1993).
V.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Dividing The
Marital Business Without Joining The Husband's Parents As
Parties.
Husband claims it was an abuse of the trial c o u r t s discretion

not to join his parents as "necessary parties" to the divorce and
division of marital assets, because they contributed a substantial
amount

of

capital

to

the

business
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the

court

divided.

This

contention is without merit. First, the parents were not necessary
parties.

U.R.C.P. Rule 19(a).

Second, the trial court has broad

discretion in determining when a party will be joined and the trial
court below alleviated any prejudicial effects in fashioning the
award.

U.R.C.P. Rule 19(b); Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d

941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) a f f d sub nom; Landes v. Capital City
Bank. 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990).
A. Husband's Parents Were Not Necessary Parties To The
Divorce And Division Of Marital Assets Under Utah Rule
Civ. Proc. 19.
A necessary party "is one whose presence is required

for a

full and fair determination of his rights as well as of the rights
of the other parties to the suit."

Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock

Transfer Co. . 695 P.2d 109, 114 (Utah 1984) (italics added).

While

Mrs. Schwartz concedes that Mr. Schwartz7s parents' testimony was
important to the determination of various issues at trial, it does
not follow that they were "required" to be parties.

In fact, their

very presence as witnesses was completely adequate to secure their
interests in the money they loaned to the marital business.
307, Finding 54.)

(R. at

Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

states in relevant part:
Persons to be joined if feasible.
A person
who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
shall be joined as a party in the action if
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, or (2)
he claims an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may
24

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave
any of the persons already parties subject to
a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple,
or
otherwise
inconsistent
obligations by reason of the claimed interest.
(italics added).

Mr. Schwartz has failed to establish any of

these elements, and is unable to do so.

Furthermore, if Mr.

Schwartz's position is accepted than any creditor of a marital
asset

would

proceedings.

be

of

necessity

made

a

party

to

the

divorce

Divisions of marital property almost always include

divisions of both assets and debts—the creditors need not be a
party in order to assure payment of these debts.
B.
The Trial Court Had Broad Discretion In Joining
Parties And Alleviated Any Possible Prejudice To Parents
In Fashioning The Award.
Once a party has been found a xnecessary party' under Rule
19(a), the next step is an analysis under Rule 19(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure which explains what a court can do when
joining a necessary party isn't feasible.

In that instance,

the court shall determine whether in equity
and good conscience the action should proceed
among the parties before it, or should be
dismissed, the absent person thus regarded as
indispensable. The factors to be considered
by the court include: first, to what extent a
judgment rendered in the person's absence
might be prejudicial to him or those already
parties; second, the extent to which, by
protective provisions in the judgment, by the
shaping of relief, or other measure, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third,
whether a judgment rendered in the person's
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the
plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the
action is dismissed for non-joinder.
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The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the need for a two-part test,
consisting of an analysis first under 19(a) and next under 19(b).
Seftel v. Capital Citv Bank. 767 P. 2d 941, 945
1989).

(Utah Ct. App.

Obviously since the issue was raised for the first time on

appeal, the trial

court did not make this two-part analysis.

"However," added the Seftel Court, "a trial c o u r t s failure to
follow the two-step inquiry under Rule 19 is harmless error, if,
upon a review of the record, there is clear evidence to support the
trial court's ultimate conclusion."

Id.

In another context the

Utah Supreme Court has said, "we may affirm trial court decisions
on

any

proper

ground (s)

.

.

."

Buehner

Associates, 752 P. 2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).

Block

Co.

v.

UWC

The Court has also held

that where evidence is admitted which might support a decision, but
no specific finding was made, it can be concluded "that the court
implicitly" made the necessary finding.

Olympus Hills Shopping

Center, Ltd. v. Landes, 821 P.2d 451, 455 (Utah 1991).
The

record

supports

the

trial

court's

discretion

joining the husband's parents as xnecessary parties.'

in

not

Step one of

the inquiry, an analysis under 19(a), was accomplished in part "A"
above.

Under 19(b), or step-two, the division of the marital

business (in which grandparents had a financial interest) was not
prejudicial.

The court so shaped the relief as to require both

parties to share equally in the debt to the grandparents.
findings of fact established the following:
52. To start the business, they [Mr. and
Mrs. Schwartz] borrowed $20,000 from Father's
26

The

parents. Before separation they borrowed an
additional $25,000 from Father's parents.
53.
Neither of these
loans were
evidenced by a promissory note, nor were any
terms of repayment established for the loans.
54.
Since the separation in 1993,
parents have loaned an additional $21,333.30
to Father for the business. For these loans
to the business, parents are owed $66,3 33.30
by the parties, plus interest.
67.
Post-separation, Father's parents
requested that the loans be reduced to written
documentation and they requested repayment.
While the Court will not so order, the parties
do owe the parents the described sum and
appropriate
written
evidence
should
be
prepared.
(R. 303-05.)
business
judgment.

The grandparents' interest

loans was

adequately

protected

in repayment
by

the

trial

Hence, even if they could be considered

x

of the
court's

necessary

parties' under 19(a), the trial court would not have abused its
discretion in refusing join them as parties.
VI.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Requiring The
Husband To Pay Half Of The Total Fees Of The Custody
Evaluator.
The decision whether or not to award costs or attorney fees in

the discretion of the trial court.

Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P. 2d

818, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77
(Utah Ct. App.

1991) .

The award

of either party's

costs or

attorney fees requires a finding of financial need of the payee and
the financial ability to pay of the payor.

Id.

In the matter

below the trial court did not order either party to pay the other's
costs or fees.

The trial court found as follows:
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91.
Nor
does
significant need. . . .

Mother

demonstrate

92.
Father's attorney fees are in the
sum of $8,020.00, which appears necessarily
incurred and reasonable in amount.
93.
Mother's attorney fees are in the
sum of $5,125.00, which appears necessarily
incurred and reasonable in amount.
94.
Neither party has the capacity to
pay the other's fees.
95. The cost of the custody evaluation
should be borne equally by both parties. To
the extent not already done, each should pay
one-half of the evaluation.
(R. 301.)

The Amended Decree of Divorce ordered, "12.

The Court

orders that there is an additional sum of $731.98 due and owing to
Elizabeth B. Stewart, who performed the custodial evaluation."

(R.

319.) Attorney for Mr. Schwartz objected to this finding, claiming
that it was not the court's intent for husband to have to pay half
of the costs of calling the custodial evaluator as a witness.
326.)

(R.

Counsel for Mrs. Schwartz responded arguing the following:
Defendant is objecting to charges made by
Elizabeth B. Stewart, who charged $731.98 for
coming to court. Elizabeth B. Stewart was the
psychologist who was appointed by the Court to
make an analysis of the plaintiff, the
defendant and their children and to report to
the Court, which she did. Both the plaintiff
and defendant stipulated that Elizabeth B.
Stewart would be appointed. It was well known
that she would make a recommendation and it
was well known that she would be called to
court to testify.
She was not plaintiff's
witness in the sense that she was retained by
the plaintiff and paid by the plaintiff, as
the defendant did in calling his own expert,
Dr. Gayle Stringham.
Rather the court
appointed Elizabeth B. Stewart, who performed
28

an evaluation. As part of that evaluation,
she came to court and testified as to her
findings. It is, therefore, only fair that
both parties would share in the cost of her
coming to court and testifying.
(R. 329.)

Accepting this argument (as the court must have done

because the decree was not modified) the charges from Elizabeth B.
Stuart were not plaintiff's

costs,

but were court

divided equally between the parties.

costs

to be

Because the court was not

requiring Mr. Schwartz to pay plaintiff's costs, but was rather
requiring both parties to bear their equal share of the court
appointed evaluators' total fees, no finding of need or ability to
pay was necessary.

Finally, since the above-quoted paragraph

demonstrates a reasonable basis upon which that decision was based,
the court did not abuse its discretion.

See supra

Crookston.

CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the factual findings and discretionary decisions made by trial court below.

First, all factual

findings must be upheld because all are adequately supported by the
record; furthermore, since Mr. Schwartz has failed to marshal the
evidence this Court must assume the findings are sufficiently
supported by the record and consequently, not clearly erroneous.
Second, the remaining discretionary decisions of the court must
also be affirmed because each was supported by a reasonable basis
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and none were arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion,
DATED this /7

day of March, 1995.

DON PETERSEN
Attorney for Appellee
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